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Reframing Federalism — The Affordable Care Act
(and Broccoli) in the Supreme Court
Wendy K. Mariner, J.D., M.P.H., Leonard H. Glantz, J.D., and George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
The U.S. Supreme Court decision to uphold most
of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), including the
insurance-coverage requirement, allows historic
reforms in the health care system to move forward.1,2 Because the justices were split four to
four on whether the ACA was constitutional,
Chief Justice John Roberts was able to write the
lead opinion that commanded five votes for whatever outcome he determined was constitutional.
The chief justice’s leadership in upholding almost
all of the ACA was unanticipated, as was much
of his legal reasoning. It was widely assumed
that the interpretation of the Commerce Clause
by the Court would determine whether the Constitution authorized Congress to require individuals to purchase a product from private companies, something Congress had never done
before and, therefore, something the Court had
never considered.3,4 It was not surprising that
the chief justice found no Commerce Clause authority for the individual mandate. The surprise
was that he saved the individual mandate by determining that it was a constitutional tax. The
chief justice received support for each of these
conclusions from two different four-justice groups,
sometimes referred to as the liberal and conservative wings of the Court. Perhaps most unexpected, seven justices voted to limit the power of
the federal government to impose conditions on
federal funding allocated to the states.
Direct Federal Regulation under
the Commerce Clause

The chief justice began his opinion by describing
our federal system, underlining that the federal
government possesses only limited powers —
those listed or enumerated in the Constitution.
Powers not granted to the federal government in
the Constitution are retained by the states. In this
case, the question was whether either the federal
power to regulate commerce or the power to tax
authorized specific provisions of the ACA.
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The Commerce Clause has historically been
interpreted as granting the federal government
broad power to regulate matters of interstate
commerce and activities that affect such commerce.5 Examples include the regulation of drugs,6
consumer products,7 air and water pollution,8
workplace safety,9 and discrimination in employment.10 Nonetheless, the chief justice concluded that the Commerce Clause did not include the
power to impose a mandate on individuals to buy
health insurance from a private company. Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence
Thomas, and Samuel Alito, in a jointly written
dissent, agreed with the chief justice regarding
the limitations of the Commerce Clause.
In the majority view on this issue, the power
of the federal government to require or regulate
behavior applies only to people who are actively
engaged in commerce. As the chief justice put
it, “The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it. . . .”1 (italics in
original). These justices accepted the argument
that individuals who are not currently seeking care
or under the care of physicians or other health
professionals “are not currently engaged in any
commercial activity involving health care.” They
rejected the argument by the government that
the fact that virtually everyone is or will at some
point be in the health care market empowers
Congress to regulate how they pay for their care.
Instead, the chief justice distinguished the health
insurance market from the health care market,
concluding that they “involve different transactions, entered into at different times, with different providers.”1 He concluded, “The individual
mandate forces individuals into commerce precisely because they elected to refrain from commercial activity. Such a law cannot be sustained
under a clause authorizing Congress to ‘regulate
Commerce.’”1
The decisive issue for these five justices was
their view of federalism, specifically how to dis-
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tinguish federal authority to regulate commerce
from the inherent authority of the state (“police
power”) to directly regulate individuals, such as
by requiring immunizations and school attendance. If the Commerce Clause allowed the federal government to regulate people who are not
engaged in commerce, they worried, then the
federal government would have the same power
that states have to regulate individual behavior,
because almost anything that anyone does or
does not do can affect the national economy.
Congress can regulate a great deal of what people do, but these five justices drew the line at
inactivity, lest the Commerce Clause “give Congress the same license to regulate what we do
not do, fundamentally changing the relation between the citizen and the Federal Government. . . . That is not the country the Framers
of our Constitution envisioned.”1 In the chief
justice’s words, “Every day individuals do not do
an infinite number of things. . . . Any police
power to regulate individuals as such, as opposed to their activities, remains vested in the
states.”1
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented from
the Commerce Clause ruling. The Ginsburg
opinion was joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor,
Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan, together comprising the remaining four justices on the Court.
They accepted the argument of the government
that health insurance is simply a method of paying for health care, along with self-payment (or
self-insurance) and reliance on charity.11 Virtually everyone in the country uses health care,12
so they are necessarily health care consumers.
More than 86% of national personal health care
expenditures are paid through insurance.13
Thus, Justice Ginsburg concluded, the mandate
regulates people who are or will inevitably be
active in the health care market and Congress
can regulate the terms on which they pay for
their care: “Persons subject to the mandate must
now pay for medical care in advance (instead of
at the point of service) and through insurance
(instead of out of pocket).”1 The Ginsburg opinion characterized the uninsured as getting a “free
ride,”1 a term often used as a major justification
for the individual mandate.14
Justice Ginsburg concluded that health care
and its financing were unique and therefore
found that Commerce Clause authority for the
individual mandate would not result in an unrestrained expansion of federal power. She specifn engl j med 367;12

ically rejected the conclusion that finding the
individual mandate valid under the Commerce
Clause would mean that the federal government
could require people to purchase healthy vegetables, including broccoli, which she characterized as “the broccoli horrible.”1 She argued
that broccoli purchases could be easily distinguished and that the claim that broccoli or vegetable purchases would have a substantial effect
on health care costs required a “chain of inferences” that previous Commerce Clause cases had
rejected.15
Federal Power to Tax

Chief Justice Roberts saved the individual mandate by finding that the payment for noncompliance is a tax, not a penalty, that Congress has
authority to impose under the Taxing Power, an
enumerated power distinct from the Commerce
Clause.16 With the Ginsburg opinion, the chief
justice had a five-to-four majority for this conclusion.
The ACA calls the payment a “penalty” for not
having health insurance, but the Court is not
bound by this label. The chief justice reasoned
that the penalty functions like a tax. The ACA
does not prescribe any punishment for failing to
have coverage. Instead, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) collects the payment with federal income taxes. The IRS is authorized to withhold
the payment from any refund due the taxpayer,
but it is barred from imposing criminal prosecution or additional penalties for nonpayment.
Moreover, the payment amount is a small percentage of taxable income and is capped at a
relatively low-level health insurance premium.17
Thus, the failure to have coverage is not unlawful; it is simply taxable.
The joint dissent argued that the Court should
take Congress at its word in calling the payment
a “penalty,” asserting that upholding the mandate as a tax amounted to rewriting, rather than
interpreting, the statute.1
Indirect Federal Regulation through
Conditional Federal Spending

The ACA amends the Medicaid statute by adding
a new category of eligible recipients: persons
younger than 65 years of age with incomes below 133% of the federal poverty level ($14,170 for
an individual and $23,050 for a family of four).18
Existing categories were narrower and more specific, such as families with children, pregnant
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women, and Supplemental Security Income recipients, with varied income ceilings for different
groups. The federal government will pay 100%
of the cost of the newly eligible beneficiaries
through 2016 and 90% after 2020, instead of the
50% to 83% that it now pays for currently eligible categories. One of the possible sanctions for
a state that does not comply with the new Medicaid eligibility rules is forfeiture of federal funding for the entire Medicaid program in the state.
In the most unexpected result, seven justices
concluded that the new category of eligibility
for Medicaid in the ACA could not be imposed
on the states as a condition of continuing to receive federal Medicaid funds for existing state
Medicaid programs. The Spending Power of Congress is an important source of power in areas
in which the federal government does not have
direct authority.16 For example, although Congress has no constitutional authority to set a
national minimum drinking age (or to require
states to enact state laws), it has restricted eligibility for full federal highway funding to states
that have laws that set the minimum drinking
age at 21 years.19 Because states are free to accept or reject federal funds and the conditions
that come with them, the Court has never found
that a condition on federal funding is an impingement on state sovereignty.
The Court, nonetheless, agreed with the argument of the 26 states that challenged this provision of the ACA, that, in practice, the states have
no choice but to accept the “new,” expanded eligibility category and amend state Medicaid laws
accordingly. The Court reasoned that if a state
refused to accept this “new” Medicaid expansion,
the federal government could “penalize” the
state by terminating its participation in — and
all federal funding for — the “old” Medicaid program. The Court found that this “penalty” made
the offer of new federal funding “coercive,” such
that the federal government was “forcing” the
states to accept it. In the opinion of the Court,
federal coercion of states violated the core principle of federalism.
The chief justice also emphasized that the
Medicaid expansion was intended to complete
the construction of an overarching federal program: “It is no longer a program to care for the
neediest among us, but rather an element of a
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage.”1 Medicare covers
1156
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persons 65 years of age or older, and the ACA
will allow all those younger than 65 years of age
to buy federally regulated health insurance through
a federally regulated exchange, with federal subsidies for those with incomes between 100% and
400% of the federal poverty level. The Medicaid
expansion, if adopted by all states, would bring
almost everyone into a federally regulated system,
something that both the chief justice and jointdissent justices appear to consider objectionable.
Federalism

The three opinions present strikingly different
views of the authority of the federal government
in relation to individuals and to the states. The
chief justice and the joint dissent emphasized
that the Constitution grants Congress only specifically enumerated powers, leaving all other
sovereign powers to the states. They focused on
how the Framers might have understood “commerce,” and the joint dissent quoted definitions
from 18th-century dictionaries.1 The joint dissent
argued that if Congress could regulate people
who do nothing other than “breathe in and out,”
then it becomes, in the words of Alexander
Hamilton in The Federalist, No. 33, “the hideous
monster whose devouring jaws . . . spare neither
sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor
profane.”1 Their language suggests alarm at the
prospect of an all-powerful national government
— alarm that they believe the Framers shared.
In contrast, the Ginsburg opinion viewed the
federal government as one designed to craft solutions to national problems that the states cannot solve by themselves. The joint dissent disparaged this view as treating “the Constitution
as though it is an enumeration of those problems
that the Federal Government can address,”1 rather than as a document that grants the federal
government only specific, enumerated powers.
The Ginsburg opinion replied that their views
“bear a disquieting resemblance to those longoverruled decisions” of the Court that struck
down federal legislation from the early 20th
century requiring minimum wages and maximum hours for employees.1,20 The different perspectives are reminiscent of disagreements over
New Deal legislation. This seems to be why the
Ginsburg opinion compared the ACA to the Social Security Act, noting that although Social Security was unprecedented when first enacted,
the Court found it to be a permissible exercise
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of the power of Congress to tax and spend for
the general welfare.21 They also expressed a disagreement over the nature of health care, which
Justice Ginsburg argued is unique and critical to
life and which the majority of justices saw as
just another market good.
Questions the Court Did Not Answer

By limiting the power of Congress to directly
regulate individuals under the Commerce Clause,
while allowing Congress to indirectly regulate
individuals by taxation, the Court permits the
federal government to influence individuals by
taxing them for not having health insurance.
This is now a constitutional way to regulate people who are doing nothing. It is also precisely
the type of expansion of federal power that the
chief justice said would redefine the relationship
of the federal government to individuals. Yet
nothing in the opinions appears to limit the use
of this power. Given the number of things that
“people do not do,” the taxing power is now remarkably broad. The chief justice even suggested
that a $50 tax on homeowners without energyefficient windows would be a permissible tax.1
He did not address whether a $15,000 tax on the
uninsured would be permissible or would be an
unjustified penalty. Future questions may include
whether a federal tax on failing to use public
transportation or failing to maintain a normal
body-mass index would be constitutional. As for
the “broccoli horrible” hypothetical, this opinion arguably supports congressional power to
tax people for not buying broccoli.
The most unsettling aspect of the Court decision is the novel limit on the authority of the
federal government to impose conditions on how
its money is used. The Court had never before
found a federal spending program to be coercive, and most scholars believed coercion to be
an illusory standard that the Court would not
apply. It is remarkable that the Court could conclude that states have no choice but to accept
the new Medicaid conditions with their Medicaid
funding. Although federal funding provides an
incentive for states to participate in a federal
program, it is hardly a “gun to the head,” as the
chief justice called it.1 The ACA made the new
Medicaid funding generous in order to entice the
states to participate, and Congress expected all
states to do so. However, that expectation was
based on the fact that the offer was so generous
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that no rational decision maker would refuse it,
not because it was coercive.
Because the coercion rationale seems so weak,
it is perhaps not surprising that the opinions fail
to explain what counts as coercion. The leading
case on the Spending Power, South Dakota v. Dole,
held that it was not coercive for the federal government to withhold 5% of federal highway funds
from states that failed to enact a state law raising
the minimum age for drinking alcohol to 21
years.19 In the ACA case, the Court found that it
was coercive to withhold 100% of federal Medicaid funds. However, the Court did not attempt
to draw any principled line between coercive and
noncoercive payments, so it is unclear whether
withholding anything between 5% and 100% of
funding could qualify as unconstitutionally forcing states to accept a federal program.
Moreover, although the Court found that it is
coercive to make the funding of an old program
conditional on the adoption of a new program,
it did not provide a meaningful standard for determining when a statutory amendment might
be considered a “new” federal funding program,
rather than an “amendment” of a previous program. The chief justice said that “a shift in kind,
not merely degree” creates a new program.1 The
expansion of Medicaid in the ACA altered both
the categories of individuals and the income level
that qualified for eligibility. Is a change in both
required to constitute a new program, or does
only one suffice? Federal programs, including
Medicaid, are often altered as experience suggests needed improvements.22 At this point, no
one can confidently predict how to distinguish a
new program from an amendment. Because so
many federally funded health, education, and
housing programs depend on the use of the conditional spending power, this ruling may encourage opponents of these programs to challenge
new conditions in court.
Implications

Remarkably, given all the commentary about the
importance of this case to the future authority of
the federal government, none of the opinions
made any attempt to limit the currently broad
power to regulate interstate commerce that the
federal government currently possesses. Rather,
the Court seems to have expanded federal power
to tax people for “doing nothing,” the primary
fear that brought this case to court. It is hard to
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believe that this power is as expansive as the
chief justice suggested, but his opinion did not
discuss limitations. The current taxing power
certainly would permit an increased income or
payroll tax to expand Medicare or create a new
federal substitute for Medicaid. However, the
limits of the taxing power probably will not be
tested soon. It is the power that Congress is least
likely to exercise in an era of widespread antipathy
to tax increases.
The lack of health care for the poor is a national problem that the federal government was
trying to fix and one that only the federal government can fix. States cannot solve national
problems. With health insurance exchanges open
to all legal residents and Medicare providing
coverage for elderly adults, the addition of all
low-income, nonelderly adults to Medicaid by the
ACA would give virtually the entire population
access to affordable health insurance. The decision of the Court to allow the states to reject the
Medicaid expansion, however, creates a substantial gap in the comprehensive-coverage design
of the ACA. States such as Florida and Texas,
whose governors have already pledged to reject
the Medicaid expansion, have large uninsured
populations.23 Such states may leave their uninsured populations doubly burdened. They will
deny impoverished citizens the coverage that the
federal government was willing to finance and
also leave many (who are above the tax-filing
threshold) subject to the new tax on the uninsured. The ACA does not provide tax subsidies to
those below 100% of the poverty level, because
they were expected to be covered by Medicaid.
Their impoverished legal residents must continue
to rely on the charity of safety-net providers,
which is the very problem that the ACA was designed to solve.
The broad significance of this case can be
found in the justices’ views of the proper roles
of the state and federal governments and not
just in what they ruled about the ACA itself. The
immediate effect is to return the constitutionally
blessed ACA to the political realm. It is now up
to Congress, the individual states, and especially the next president to determine the fate of
the ACA. Because the case was decided by the
vote of a single justice, however, the future of
federal involvement in health care may also depend on the views of the next justice appointed
to the Court.
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